Is That Legal?

As far as I am aware, Abe Fortas was Undersecretary of the Interior (not a Justice Department official) from 1942-1946 and as such would likely have had some concern with or direction over the War Relocation Authority, which could explain his interest in discussion of security (and public relations) connected with the Japanese relocation centers in 1944.

It should be noted that the discussion between Fortas and McCloy's assistant confirms that the military police at relocation centers were assigned there for "external security" reasons rather than to enforce "government restrictions on Japanese Americans" as is so often erroneously claimed.

Hopwood, you're right about Fortas; my error. I've corrected the post. Thanks.

On the other point you make, you're completely wrong. "External security" means security around the perimeter of the camps (as opposed to security *inside* the camps, where the Army sentries did not go). "External security" did not mean "outward-focused" security--security protecting the internees from the antelope and rattlesnakes outside the fences.

cf. cryptographer and security guru Bruce Schneier's concept of "security theater" in Beyond Fear (which btw, is frequently but not always a bad thing.)

Prof. Muller:

We can quibble over semantics but I stand by my interpretation. My dictionary defines "external" as "pertaining to, existing on, or connected with the outside or an outer part; exterior." And defines "security" as used in this connection as "safety." Hence "external security" at the relocation centers was clearly a reference to the protection of the integrity of the center through actions designed to prevent or counteract risks from outside factors.

That was the main function of the MPs posted outside the relocation centers whose duties were similar to MPs posted at WWII military bases or guards outside war production plants. Ancilary duties included checking authorization for entry and egress to and from the centers (including for residents of the centers who came and went with authorized regularity for daily recreational reasons or on temporary or permanent leave). Particular responsibility, however, lay with the prevention of possible harmful actions by persons hostile to camp residents or subversive activities by enemy agents. In that connection it should be borne in mind that there were thousands of persons of Japanese ancestry not affected by the evacuation orders still living outside the centers.

Sorry, Hopwood, you're just wrong on this. If you spend any appreciable amount of time in the archival material, you see quickly that the question of "internal security" and "external security" at the camps was a much-debated and commonly understood one. The Army had the responsibility for patrolling the outside, but they were not allowed into the camp. In rare situations where they did come in (like the Tule Lake riots, for example), it caused extreme controversy.

There is simply no way that this reference is to the army's performing any outward-directed protection.

Incidentally, Hopwood, why would Fortas have thought it "good for public relations" to keep sentries to protect against attacks or subversion from outside the camps?

Prof Muller, you say:

"...The Army had the responsibility for patrolling the outside, but they were not allowed into the camp. In rare situations where they did come in (like the Tule Lake riots, for example), it caused extreme controversy."

I agree with that except, perhaps, for the "controversy" part. The MPs also had to go inside at Manzanar to quell an anti-American riot there in December of 1942 (on the first anniversary of Pearl Harbor). In each case the MPs were asked to come in by the civilian camp director to preserve order. Where was the controversy? Was it because the rioters didn't like being squelched?

"There is simply no way that this reference is to the army's performing any outward-directed protection."

Well, on the basis of the excerpt you quoted, we don't know that. Perhaps if we could view the whole document you partially quote, it might be more enlightening.

"Incidentally, Hopwood, why would Fortas have thought it "good for public relations" to keep sentries to protect against attacks or subversion from outside the camps?"

Easy. The public knew that there were a large number of Japanese enemy aliens on the outside some of whom might try to gain entry and incite to further rioting. Also anti-Japanese feelings were high and vigilante justice was not unthinkable. I have a copy of a March 1944 Life Magazine national story about the "no no" boys and the Tule Lake riot of November 1943 in which a number of people were severely injured. Because of such publicity the relocation centers were still very much in the public eye. Fortas probably figured (with good reason) that the public might be upset if the MPs were removed at that time.

"The public knew that there were a large number of Japanese enemy aliens on the outside some of whom might try to gain entry and incite to further rioting."

Thanks for helping me start my day with a smile, Commander Hopwood.

1944 was an Election year. Support for the Democratic party quite a bit weaker than that for FDR personally.

The state of the art in opinion polls at that time hadn't even reached the "Dewey beats Truman" level yet, but the state party leadership would have been well aware of this, and would not have wanted to give up their race card.

Eric/Greg, are there any works that cover the history of maintenance of internment at the same level as "By Order of the President"?

If I'd been in a high-level security position in Dec. 1941, I'm afraid I almost certainly would have paniced and put in an immediate clampdown. Security of MAGIC had been terrifyingly lax until a clampdown earler that year, and ULTRA had uncovered a German signal warning the Japanese that the Americans might be reading PURPLE. It had appeared that the Japanese had ignored this warning, but when Pearl Harbor came out of the blue, my first thought would have been that we'd been played like fools, and that no assessments based on MAGIC could be trusted.

I don't know if I'd have calmed down by 2/19, but the moment visual confirmations came in from Coral Sea (5/7), I would've started working on my apology letter. After that point there was no non-political justification for keeping the non Kibei interned en masse (to me Kibei ~= HJ).

Simon

Simon,

In addition to whatever Profs. Muller and Robinson suggest I recommend The Spoilage (Dorothy Swaine Thomas and Richard Nishimoto), a contemporaneous study of the evacuation, detention and resettlement of Japanese in the U.S., published in 1946 by University of California Press.

Simon Spero writes:

"...ULTRA had uncovered a German signal warning the Japanese that the Americans might be reading PURPLE. It had appeared that the Japanese had ignored this warning,"

It not only "appeared" that Japan had ignored the warning but Japan DID ignore the warning. In fact there was more than one such warning to Japan (another was from the Spanish ambassador to Japan in May of 1943) but Japan continued to use PURPLE (and we continuted to read it) throughout the war and even after the surrender as the occupation forces were getting organized.

The value of MAGIC was such that Admiral Chester Nimitz rated it as "the equivalent of another whole Pacific Fleet" and General Thomas Handy, Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S.Army,claimed that "it shortened the war in Europe by at least a full year." [Quotes from "Pearl Harbor,Final Judgement," Henry Clausen and Bruce Lee.]

"but when Pearl Harbor came out of the blue, my first thought would have been that we'd been played like fools, and that no assessments based on MAGIC could be trusted."

If your implication is that the Japanese set us up with phony messages, your first thought would have been dead wrong. There was nothing wrong with MAGIC. We were caught with our pants down because of failure to properly assess the information we had from MAGIC soon enough, and then to disseminate the correct assessment in a timely manner. That didn't happen again.

"I don't know if I'd have calmed down by 2/19, but the moment visual confirmations came in from Coral Sea (5/7), I would've started working on my apology letter."

Based on pre-war intelligence from MAGIC intercepts and other sources, you would have been mistaken to have done so.

"After that point there was no non-political justification for keeping the non Kibei interned en masse (to me Kibei ~= HJ)."

How would you have known that those identified in MAGIC intercepts like this were only Kibei?
From DOD "The 'MAGIC' Background of Pearl Harbor"
Summary No. 174 of May 9,1941 Message# 067, page A-99:"From Los Angeles (Nakauchi)
To: Tokyo (Aaimudaijin)
"...With regard to airplane manufacturing plants and other military establishments..we plan to establish very close relations with various
organizations and in strict secrecy have them keep these military establishments under close surveillance... We have already established contacts with absolutely reliable Japanese in the San Pedro and San Diego area who will keep a close watch on all shipments of airplanes
and other war materials, and report the amounts and destination of such shippments. We shall maintain connection with our second generation who are at present in the U.S.Army, to keep us informed of various developments in the Army. We also have connections with our second
generation working in airplane plants for intelligence purposes..."

Prof. Muller writes:

"Thanks for helping me start my day with a smile, Commander Hopwood."

Your welcome. And to keep you smiling here's more from LIFE Magazine, March 20, 1944-

"TULE LAKE--At This Segregation Center are 18,000 Japanese Considered Disloyal to U.S.

"The Japanese above (photo) are trouble makers. Calling themselves "pressure boys," they are fanatically loyal to Japan. Along with 150 other men in the stockade, they were ringleaders in the November riots...Of the other 18,000 men, women, and children of Japanese ancestry...about 70% are American citizens by birth. All of the adults among them..are considered disloyal to the U.S. Either they have asked to be repatriated to Japan, or they have refused to take an oath of allegiance to the U.S.,or they are suspected of being dangerous to national security...Even if the guards were removed the Japanese probably would not try to escape. THEY ARE AFRAID OF THE TULE LAKE FARMERS..." [My emphasis]